Dapr (the Go sidecar runtime for microservices on Kubernetes) shipped the same eleven security fixes on all three supported lines. The release notes give no CVE or GHSA IDs. The serious ones break the service-to-service identity model. gRPC relay: each sidecar's internal port (50002) forwarded a proxied gRPC call addressed to a *different* app, and stamped itself as the caller with its own mTLS identity. So any workload with a Dapr identity, in any namespace, could send a call to app B's sidecar addressed to app C. App C's access policy and any caller checks in its code then saw dapr-caller-app-id: B. The sidecar also treated an app with the same ID in another namespace as the local app. Scheduler reminders: WatchJobs checked the caller's app ID but not which actor types it declared, so an app could claim another app's dapr.internal.<ns>.<app>.workflow/.activity types. It then received that app's workflow and activity reminders, including workflow inputs and history, and could stall them by acknowledging without acting or by setting a low concurrency limit. Access-control bypasses: policies matched the invoked method literally, so %61dmin/secret, or admin;x/secret on servlet-style servers, slipped past a deny rule for /admin/secret. This finishes an earlier fix that only covered %2F, %5C and %2E. A percent-encoded health-check path also skipped the API token check. Sentry OIDC: with --oidc-allowed-hosts set and no static --jwt-issuer/--oidc-jwks-uri, X-Forwarded-Host: sentry.example.com:80@attacker.example passed the allowlist and produced a discovery document pointing issuer and jwks_uri at the attacker, cached publicly for an hour. The rest: a Scheduler prefix delete that removed other apps' jobs, unauthenticated, unbounded metadata writes on the public port, sidecar crashes on malformed encrypted state, the outbox accepting forged messages on its internal topic, gRPC servers accepting headers far beyond the configured read-buffer size, and HTTP verb rules ignored for requests without metadata. 1.19.1 and 1.18.10 also fix a Placement reconnect loop that leaked a gRPC connection (about 8 goroutines a second) on every failed attempt. 1.18.10 additionally fixes workflows that became permanently unrecoverable after a save with a timer in the inbox.
PUT /v1.0/metadata/{key} on the public port now returns 404, so move any such calls to the main HTTP API port. If you use Sentry's OIDC server, set --jwt-issuer and --oidc-jwks-uri statically. Also prefer allow-list policies (defaultAction: deny) over deny-lists. Even without Dapr, the same checks apply to any Go gateway or service mesh you build: decode the path exactly once, the way the downstream router will, before you authorize it; carry the original caller's identity end to end instead of re-deriving it at each hop; and never build an OIDC issuer from a request header.