CVE-2026-98432 (kernel CNA: CVSS 9.8) is a race in IPv4 TCP connection setup: a retransmitted SYN processed on another CPU can build a SYNACK from IP options that the new child socket has already freed (ip_options_build()), and the same bug exists on the request-socket migration path (net.ipv4.tcp_migrate_req=1 or a BPF_SK_REUSEPORT_SELECT_OR_MIGRATE program). It has been there since Linux 4.4 and is fixed upstream in 5.10.272, 5.15.223, 6.1.190, 6.6.159, 6.12.113, 6.18.56 and 7.2.10. Anthropic's 10-27 write-up describes a proof-of-concept that gets a root shell, with no credentials, on a Linux server that has a multipath TCP (MPTCP) listener: about 48 minutes of retries to leak a kernel pointer and defeat KASLR, then about 5 minutes to hijack a callback. A lost race only fails the handshake, so an attacker can keep retrying. The Go link: since Go 1.24, net opens Linux listen sockets as MPTCP by default, so practically every Go HTTP/gRPC server on a kernel with MPTCP enabled is exactly that kind of listener. After a user filed #82717 asking to flip the default, the Go Security Team posted a note. It says the best fix is a patched kernel, that the underlying bug is not MPTCP-specific, and that it's "premature" to change Go's default. You can opt out with GODEBUG=multipathtcp=0 at runtime, godebug multipathtcp=0 in the main module's go.mod, or per socket with ListenConfig.SetMultipathTCP(false). Damien Neild adds that dropping IPv4 TCP packets that carry IP options *may* work as a packet-filter mitigation (unconfirmed). Distro status as of this morning: Debian (bookworm 6.1.190-1, trixie 6.12.113-1), Oracle UEK, SUSE Linux Micro 6.2/SLES 16.0 and Amazon Linux 2023 kernel6.12/kernel6.18 have fixes. Ubuntu's linux packages for 22.04/24.04/26.04/26.10 are still "work in progress", and Amazon Linux 2 and the AL2023 default kernel are "Pending Fix".
GODEBUG=multipathtcp=0 on exposed Go services (or sysctl net.mptcp.enabled=0 host-wide, which makes Go fall back to plain TCP), check with ss -Mltn that no MPTCP listeners remain, and consider dropping inbound IPv4 packets with IP options at the edge. Treat those as narrowing the known exploit, not a fix: nobody has shown whether RCE is possible without MPTCP, and the plain-TCP SYN-retransmit path stays racy. No in-the-wild exploitation has been reported.