Between Sep 9 and Oct 7 an attacker used stolen service-account credentials to get into PingCAP's internal systems. PingCAP noticed on Oct 7 and says that by Oct 14 all identified compromised credentials were invalidated and the access paths blocked (incident report, Oct 19; CEO note, Oct 23). NebuSec's investigation (Oct 21) lays out the chain. The attacker got in through a compromised GitHub account that exposed private repos. Service-account private keys sitting in Git commit history and plaintext Terraform state, plus a plaintext Jira API token and a bot key in code, let them pivot into Google Cloud (eight service accounts), Jira and the internal chat used for TiDB alerts. Customers' AWS keys that had been pasted into Jira support tickets led on to S3 buckets holding TiDB diagnostic data. BigQuery EXTRACT jobs wrote 6,458 tables to Cloud Storage as .json.gz (Sep 23β24), and the attacker downloaded them with rclone (Oct 2β5). What was exposed: names and emails, org/project/cluster IDs, SQL editor text and errors, contracts, pricing and billing, and encrypted TiDB Cloud API-key values (the encryption key was not exposed). There's no evidence that data stored in customers' TiDB databases was accessed, or that the attacker ran commands or stayed in production. Four vulnerabilities found in the stolen source code were fixed and retested by Oct 14. The attacker group (FulcrumSec) claims 10.6 TB, 413 repos and 40K+ active API keypairs, per InfoQ (Oct 25). None of that is verified.
gitleaks/trufflehog over full Git history, look for unencrypted remote state, find service-account JSON keys you could replace with workload identity, and set alerts for bulk BigQuery/S3 exports. If you use TiDB Cloud, replace your management API keys and rotate anything you ever gave their support team.