Bulletin dated Oct 15; advisories published 10-16 06:21 IST. GHSA-w44g-8m76-8gc5 (High 7.4): an AuthorizationPolicy DENY rule with methods (or ALLOW with notMethods) compiled to a case-sensitive :method matcher, so over HTTP/2 a request sent as post instead of POST didn't match and reached the workload. HTTP/1.1 isn't affected because its codec rejects lowercase methods before authorization. Matching is now case-insensitive; interim fix is an ALLOW policy with an explicit methods allow-list. Same class as CVE-2021-39155 (case-sensitive host matching). GHSA-7p2q-4xvg-vxc6 (High 7.7): in ambient mode, a ServiceEntry in any namespace that claims an IP-addressed waypoint's address makes istiod panic and crash-loop until it's removed, halting config distribution and certificate rotation for the whole mesh. Mitigate by limiting ServiceEntry create/update via RBAC or using hostname waypoints (the default). Fixed in 1.29.9 (final 1.29 release, EOL Oct 15), 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, which also carry the Envoy OAuth2/api_key_auth CONNECT crash fixes (covered 10-13).
π₯ What Changed
Light Sunday. Two Auth/IAM security releases: Istio's AuthorizationPolicy fails open on lowercase HTTP/2 methods, and ZITADEL fixes three account takeovers. The Go team has started rewriting the net/http Transport connection pool.
Holds (all unchanged): Kafka 4.4.0 artifacts are up but there's no announcement yet (kafka-site PR #925 still open). grpc-go v1.85 is still unreleased (latest v1.84.0; 1.85.x cherry-picks 10-16). Go #81957 CL 847406 and alt CL 844405 unmerged, backports #82189/#82190 open; #82177 CL 848985, #82026 CL 846325 and #81759 CL 840845 under review; #81864 tip-only. No new Go point release.
Released 2026-10-15 (advisories 17:20 IST); affects 4.0.0β4.19.4. Device code (8.1): Login V2 approved an OAuth Device Authorization as soon as a signed-in browser opened the link, with no user-code entry and no consent, so one click sent the victim's tokens to the attacker's device; the OIDC service API approve endpoint also skipped project access settings. Fixed with user code + explicit Allow; 3.x (EOL 08-31) gets no fix. Host-header poisoning (8.1): password-reset, invite and verification links were built from client-supplied x-zitadel-public-host / x-zitadel-forward-host / x-forwarded-host; a malformed value like evil.com:443/ resolved to an empty host and silently skipped the trusted-domain check, so real single-use codes pointed to the attacker's host (including for instance admins). Partial mitigation: have the proxy strip/overwrite those headers. Forgeable proof (7.4): the verificationCheck cookie was SHA-256 of user ID + a client fingerprint cookie with no server secret, letting anyone set the first password/passkey/IdP link for users who had none yet (invited or API-created). Now signed with a server-side secret (ZITADEL_SESSION_COOKIE_SECRET), bound to user and browser, 5-min expiry. Caveat: the first two are in the Next.js Login V2 UI; the device-flow API path is in the Go backend.
Filed 2026-10-17 02:35 IST by Damien Neil. With HTTP/2 now in std, the plan is to drop the HTTP/2-specific pool and manage all client connections in one pool, using the rewrite to address the lack of dial coalescing for new HTTP/2 connections and problems from LIFO idle-connection reuse. Proposal #79664 (Transport.MaxRequestsPerConn) describes the LIFO issue: bursty, fleet-correlated clients behind a round-robin LB keep reusing the connection to the slowest backend until most traffic lands on it. CLs 850107 (tests), 850108 (internal/nettest) and 850109 "rewrite the transport connection pool" (+956/β842; one clientConnPoolEntry per target) are all under review; the CL says the new pool "for now behaves mostly identically" to the old one. No release target stated.
π Worth Your Time
Final report posted 14 Oct 12:45 IST (missed while 10-15/10-16 editions failed). Oct 8, 16:30 IST β Oct 9, 05:00 IST (12h30m) in us-central1, then a recurrence Oct 9, 16:35β22:16 IST (5h41m) in us-central1-b: 503 UNAVAILABLE on WriteObject, client timeouts and slow successful writes. A traffic-sorting optimization in the GCS load-balancing layer, meant to ease local capacity limits, bypassed capacity-aware routing, so a few low-capacity backends got an outsized share of writes and ingestion timed out; a separate metadata-DB update added errors and was rolled back. The recurrence came from an incomplete rollback of an upload-planner feature. Emergency capacity was blocked by regional limits, so engineers drained hot nodes, disabled the optimization, and fully reverted the LB change. Preventive actions: validate LB logic changes in smaller regions first, enforce capacity constraints so routing can't bypass pre-spilling safeguards, and speed up internal data movement in busy cells.