Published 2026-10-09 by X41 D-Sec. Envoy’s hot-restart path puts file-backed robust pthread mutexes in Pod-shared /dev/shm. Those structures expose raw pointers → ASLR leak plus an arbitrary write via unlock unlink. Confirmed on Envoy 1.38.3 and 1.39.1; the design dates to ~2016. Upstream closed the report as a non-issue under a single-container threat model.
Concrete from the primary:
- A neighbor container with root or same UID can reach Envoy’s shared memory → mesh identity, mTLS material, and upstreams.
- Kata / microVM does not help: a Pod is still one VM; containers inside share the same
/dev/shm. - Mitigations:
--disable-hot-restart, or a per-container emptyDir Memory mount for/dev/shmso sidecars no longer share the mutex files.